Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014. 157 pp. ISBN: 978-0-7456-7247-2  

https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+End+of+American+World+Order-p-9780745672472

Reviewed by Andrew Alexander Post-Graduate Student Shanghai University, People’s Republic of China Email: aalex2@protonmail.com - aalex2@shu.edu.cn

Published in 2014 in a period of constant academic debate on the possible or even inevitable demise of what is considered the United States-driven world order of liberal globalization, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at American University, Washington, D.C., Amitav Acharya offers a compelling theory describing a global paradigm shift away from a uni-polar hegemony to what he describes as a multiplex of world actors in a more complementary, rather than hierarchical world scheme. Operating on the basis of a world system seemingly dominated by an American liberal hegemony, Acharya distinguishes between what he describes as liberal democratic globalization as the dominant scheme propelled by the United States, and a global hegemony of liberal democratic globalization as a world system, separate from the United States. While the latter was created by the United States, it has evolved into an autonomous global force, independent of the fate of the United States. For simplification, Acharya combines hegemonic liberal globalization and American-led liberal hegemonic order into what he calls the American World Order (AWO). Acharya argues that regardless of the fate of the United States, the AWO itself is in decline and will be replaced. Therefore, Acharya refutes the prospect of emerging powers assuming the position of the United States within the current AWO. Acharya predicts that a multi-polar regional global structure based on cooperation will replace the bipolar and uni-polar global structure that has dominated the globe since the end of the Second World War.  

In an attempt to articulate the emerging cooperative regionalism, Acharya describes the new world order metaphorically as a multiplex cinema. In Multiplex Cinema Theory (MCT), the global order can be viewed as a building containing multiple theaters where a range of diverse movies from a range of studios can be played. Acharya describes a system where smaller independent films and larger productions, from Hollywood to Bollywood to communist propaganda films, would all be held under the same roof. Global producers or actors operate simultaneously within the multiplex cinema. In MCT, “[n]o single director or producer would monopolize the audience’s attention or loyalty. . . . The audience has a choice of shows. They can also watch, enjoy, and compare several or all of them” (p. 7). Within Acharya’s Multiplex Cinema Theory, there are two possible models that could emerge. First, the Global Concert Model describes unity among the world’s great powers as global institutions and laws seek the same interest of stability. The global powers have a common interest and responsibility in preserving world order. This model describes a multipolar hegemony of global powers rather than a uni-polar hegemony of a single state, but a hegemony nonetheless. The second Multiplex Cinema model, the Regional World Model, is a cooperative and non-hegemonic order, where the needs of the countries within a region are addressed and liberal institutions like the United Nations are strengthened by a more equitable burden sharing. The Regional World Model is a “stepping stone” to universalism (p. 110). Both models have their strengths and weaknesses, and Acharya sees the ideal Multiplex world as having a hybrid of concert and regional models. Acharya sees the AWO in decline, regardless of the condition of the United States itself. He refutes ideas of regional hegemonies or emerging powers replacing the United States within the AWO, and he also refutes the concept of a new uni-polarity to replace the AWO. Instead, Acharya predicts a “political order of a culturally diverse world that rests on political and economic interconnectedness, as well as institutional arrangements, relying not on the power or purpose of a single actor or mechanism, but of a range of actors” (p. 113). 

Acharya brilliantly explores the decline of the AWO and possible replacement systems through critically examining a range of theoretical frameworks. From uni-polarity and Hegemonic Stabilization Theory to realist uni-polar illusion perspective to structural liberalism and beyond, Acharya intricately critiques various theories of prospective global models. Acharya offers an in-depth examination of American liberal democratic hegemony, including separating the United States from American hegemony. Acharya also challenges the assumption that the United States, or democratic liberalism, has ever been able to successfully attain a true global hegemony. Acharya raises important issues in the uni-polar perspective, and polarity in general.  

A problematic explanation in the book is to why regional hegemonies, such as China, would not occur. The argument against regional hegemonies is based upon the idea that regional players will instinctively work to serve local interests once they are no longer compelled to serve American interests. Acharya describes a new regional liberalism, dependent on regional and trans-regional institutions in a less legal formation than the EU as an important component to this dynamic, but not as an explanation for the previous claim. In attempts to give an example, Acharya describes China as an unlikely regional hegemon due to failures in military reach and border diplomacy, and as a public goods provider (p. 111). However, Acharya fails to detail how China, or any other actor, would naturally feel inclined to serve local interests at the fall of the AWO. His example of China and the two possible models for Chinese regional hegemony, Monroe Doctrine and Benign Hegemony, does not satisfactorily rule out regional hegemony by China or any other actor. Acharya fails to account for trans-regional impacted hegemony, whether by alliances, such as between Russia and China (Weitz, 2017, pp. 27-36) or China’s One Belt One Road initiative.

Missing from his explanation of AWO and liberal hegemony is the neoliberal economic policy which drives it. Absent the AWO, either a substantial proportion of the global economic structure will shift, which would have drastic impacts on regional geo-politic, or the AWO will not have truly declined. How would liberalized economies in Asia, for example, adapt with such a restructure? Would economies like China’s be able to adapt with relative ease? Trans-regional reach by unique states, especially those with asymmetrical access to energy fields such as oil, combined with a global economic shift has enormous potential to drastically change the global landscape. The strategic purpose for control of oil for the ends of global military standing is widely discussed. However, just as influential in these imagined scenarios is access to oil and shaping petrol currency in the time of a global (or trans-regional) economic shift. As David Harvey points out, manipulating the petrodollar was crucial for the United States in establishing what Acharya today calls the AWO (2003). This is not to say that dissolving neoliberal economics would be inherently negative, but that it could reshape inter- and intra-regional dynamics and potentially forge new hegemonies.  

The Multiplex Cinema Theory is a welcomed evolution in the realm of global metaphors and, as Acharya points out, moves well beyond Joseph Nye’s limited comparison of the world order as a game of chess (p. 6). As comprehensive as MCT is, it is impeded by state-centrism and the assumption of freedom of choice. While Acharya addresses realist and liberal philosophies, he only briefly mentions varieties of global actors other than the state and inter-state. Acharya does not sufficiently account for trans-national corporations and financial institutions, nor does he account for theories of class structures in his MCT. It would have been interesting if Acharya had critiqued or included concepts such as the global elite and Sklair’s Trans-National Capital Class (1995) and Robinson’s Trans-National State (2001). The MCT is also based on the assumption of free choice by the audience. In this way, Acharya’s theory reflects a “free market” paradigm by which state systems succeed or fail based on their appeal to, and selection by the audience. While there is substantial evidence that popular agency has been stifled under the AWO, there is little evidence that its removal would foster such agency, or that it would allow audience members free movement to change “theaters” within the cinema at their will. Perhaps the MTC’s most apt feature is that the audiences in the cinema are shown precisely what they are meant to see by the producers and studios that construct the films. Most films require a suspension of disbelief by the audience with little to no regard for the intricacies of how the films were made, who has benefited by their production, or how agreements, pricing, locations, etc. were reached. Acharya offers a spectacular examination of the current world order through thoughtful investigation of a multitude of theoretical concepts and historical analyses. Furthermore, he bravely reaches for an alternative to a dominating global structure while acknowledging the inherent speculation and risks involved with such an endeavor. Overall, the book is an indispensable addition to the dialectic of Global Studies and recommended for anyone interested in international relations today and the possibilities for tomorrow.